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ABSTRACT
Community and health worker engagement will be key to polio eradication in Karachi, Pakistan. In this study, the authors
conducted participant observation, interviews, and a document review in SITE Town, Karachi, an area that in recent years has
harbored poliovirus. SITE’s diverse population includes large numbers of internally displaced persons who are disproportionately
affected by polio and are more likely than other populations to refuse the polio vaccine. Vaccine acceptance and worker motivation
in SITE Town were shaped by the discrepancy in funding and attention for polio eradication campaigns as compared with routine
services. Parental vaccine refusals stemmed from a distrust of government and international actors that provided few services but
administered polio vaccine door-to-door every month. Addressing this discrepancy could therefore be key to eliminating polio. The
authors suggest short-term improvements to routine immunization and sanitation in key polio endemic areas, coupled with a long-
term focus on sustainable improvements to routine immunization and broader health services.
The Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) has made
remarkable progress in recent years. After the elimination of
wild polio from India and Nigeria, there were only 106 cases
of polio globally in 2015, the lowest in history. Achieving
eradication now depends primarily on stopping transmission
in the two remaining endemic countries, Pakistan and
Afghanistan.
In Pakistan, recent improvements in operations and access
led to a reduction in polio cases, from 328 wild and circu-
lating vaccine-derived polio cases in 2014 to 55 in 2015.
Yet, polio transmission stubbornly persists. Both vaccine
refusals and operational issues contribute to immunity gaps
in polio-endemic areas of the country (GPEI, 2015a;
Independent Monitoring Board of the GPEI, 2015;
SteelFisher et al., 2015). Stopping polio in Pakistan will
likely require improving vaccine acceptance by parents
and further motivating polio workers to seek out and vacci-
nate every child.
This article explores community and health worker
engagement in polio eradication in Karachi. Drawing on
research conducted in early 2012, we focus on SITE Town,
an area that in recent years has harbored poliovirus (Table 1).
Our aim is not to evaluate the effectiveness of the polio
program but rather to qualitatively describe some challenges
workers faced and explore why some parents refused polio
vaccine. In SITE, vaccine acceptance and worker motivation
were shaped by the discrepancy in funding and attention for
polio eradication campaigns as compared with routine ser-
vices. Addressing this discrepancy could therefore be key to
eliminating polio.
SITE Town, Karachi
SITE is one of 18 towns that make up Karachi, a megacity of
more than 20 million people in the province of Sindh
(Figure 1). Named after the Sindh Industrial and Trading
Estate, SITE was initially populated by industrial workers
from across Pakistan. Now, SITE is also home to large
numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs) escaping
military action. Most are ethnic Pashtuns from the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa in
Northwestern Pakistan.
These IDPs have had a chilly reception in Karachi. Major
news outlets in the country fretted about the “influx of
terrorists in the form of IDPs” (“Tight security on Sindh
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borders to stop terrorists disguised as IDPs,” 2014). In 2014,
the government of Sindh briefly made plans to block all IDPs
from entering the province and then started a registration
program; many IDPs experienced police harassment as well
as discrimination in places such as hospitals (“IDPs under
pressure in Pakistan’s Sindh Province,” 2014; “IDPs won’t be
allowed into Sindh,” 2014; Khattak, 2013).
In a recent study, children in Karachi had lower rates of
seroprotection against poliovirus than children in other parts
of the country (Habib et al., 2013). The GPEI recently char-
acterized its progress in Karachi as “volatile”: in evaluations
of 2015’s campaigns, between 20% and 60% of sampled
areas failed to clear expected bars of quality (GPEI, 2015a).
Within Karachi, IDPs are disproportionately affected by polio
and are more likely than members of other populations to
refuse polio vaccine.
Methods
The research described here, conducted in early 2012 with a
brief follow-up in 2015, was part of a larger study examining
the impact of polio eradication activities on health systems in
a variety of contexts (Closser et al., 2012, 2014). The study
protocol was approved by the Middlebury College
Institutional Review Board. Our methodology included docu-
ment review, interviews, and participant observation:
1. We collected documents about polio eradication, routine
immunization (RI), and broader health services from a
variety of sources in Karachi and Islamabad. Some were
specific to SITE Town, while others described provincial
and federal policy.
2. We conducted more than 40 semi-structured interviews
in seven of SITE Town’s nine union councils and in
government and United Nations offices in Islamabad.
Interviewees came from a variety of levels of the
health system, from community members to lady
health workers (LHWs) to city- and national-level offi-
cials (Table 2).
3. We conducted participant observation in a polio cam-
paign; in RI and other health activities; and at policy
meetings in Karachi and Islamabad. We took detailed
field notes.
We analyzed these data using NVivo software, using more
than 50 codes to identify relevant themes. For this article, we
focused on codes relating to community and health worker
satisfaction with polio campaigns and with the broader health
system.
Given that most of the information we draw on here is
from just one part of Karachi and is about 4 years old,
these findings should be interpreted not as a current
description of dynamics across Pakistan, but as a snapshot
Table 1. Confirmed Cases of Wild Polio (WPV) in Karachi, 2011–
2015.






Note: Although there were no confirmed cases in 2012, environmental
surveillance picked up wild poliovirus in Karachi’s sewage in that year
(Kazi, Murtaza, Khoja, Zaidi, & Ali, 2014).
Figure 1. SITE Town, the study area in Karachi, Pakistan.




Government, UNICEF, and WHO officials in
Islamabad
4
Government, UNICEF, and WHO officials in
Karachi
6
Medical officers (doctors) in SITE town 7
Vaccinators 7
Pharmacists 1
Lady health supervisors 4
Lady health workers 8
Employees hired only for polio 2
Parents of children targeted by polio campaign 5
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in a particular time and place. Analyses rooted in the
complexities of one particular context can effectively
tease apart the factors underlying such complex phenom-
ena as worker motivation and vaccine refusals. This
approach was designed to maximize the validity of our
findings (Bernard, 2011), with the associated limitation
being that they may not be widely generalizable. That
said, a broader analysis of vaccine refusals across multiple
countries shows that dynamics similar to the ones
described here underlie oral polio vaccine (OPV) refusal
in a variety of contexts (Closser et al., 2016).
Working in SITE Town’s Health System
The polio program is one of many health promotion activ-
ities that Ministry of Health staff members implement. The
government health system in SITE includes tertiary hospi-
tals; health centers providing immunizations and other
basic services; and a network of LHWs tasked with pro-
viding essential maternal and child health in the commu-
nity, including family planning and management of
common diseases such as diarrhea. This broader context
of health work is the backdrop to workers’ attitudes toward
the polio program.
Many ground-level staff spoke of deep commitment to
their work. After her daughter died from measles, one respon-
dent became a LHW to ensure that this did not happen to
other children. Another worker added, “It is my job, but it is
also a way for me to help people and friends in my
community.”
Yet, a number of challenges made it hard to provide high
coverage of health services such as RI. In the 2012–2013
Demographic and Health Survey, survey, only 52% of chil-
dren in urban Sindh were fully immunized. In Karachi spe-
cifically, around 40% of children were fully immunized with
the third dose of the diptheria-tetanus-pertussis vaccine
(DTP3) in the Pakistan Social and Living Standards
Measurement (PSLM) survey (Figure 2).
One major challenge in SITE was a severe shortage of
staff, from doctors to LHWs. A town-level official explained
that although LHWs were critical to providing essential inter-
ventions, “we do not have that many of them. The require-
ment of LHWs that we have, government is not supporting
it.” In 2015, an official explained that although there were 22
routine immunization centers in SITE Town, there were only
13 vaccinators posted to fill them—a number clearly insuffi-
cient to reach the needs of a population of close to a million.
LHWs also mentioned medication stockouts as a challenge,
noting that shortages frustrated their patients. One explained,
“Every six months we get 4 boxes of paracetamol. . . but I serve
a population of 1000 in more than 150 households.” Another
said, “The medicine comes late. People demand more medicine
when we do not have it.” They also mentioned the need to
improve physical infrastructure; many facilities were visibly
crumbling.
Low levels of national funding, combined with weak
accountability at the provincial level, are problems across
Sindh (Nishtar et al., 2013). One city-level official ascribed
weaknesses in governance to the complex political situation in
Karachi:
The MQM [a political party] controls Karachi and the PPP
[another political party] controls interior Sindh. So they
don’t support or work together, but these health problems
are big and have to be handled by the government, not bit
by bit through other agencies. There are many Pakistani
groups who would help, but they cannot get through the
government bureaucracy. Lots of will, but blocked
channels.
Thus, the root causes of these shortages are complex and
political.
Challenges in Areas With IDPs
Staff and resource shortages in UCs with large numbers of
IDPs were particularly acute. A worker explained that in
UC 9, “There is actually no big hospital or government
center in the area. There are only unlicensed ‘doctors.’”
Officials had made an effort to train unlicensed practi-
tioners to provide routine immunization, but the results
were disappointing.
Figure 2. Routine immunization coverage nationally in 2010,
reflecting the situation just prior to our field research. Coverage
rates of DTP3 in Karachi in this survey, the PSLM, were around
40%. A different measure of immunization coverage, taken from
nonpolio acute flaccid paralysis data on routine doses of oral polio
vaccine, suggested that about 60% of children in Karachi were fully
vaccinated. National coverage numbers in the PSLM have increased
slightly since then, while other coverage estimates (see http://www.
gavi.org/country/pakistan/) show flat or slightly decreasing cover-
age. See Figure 1 for the location of our study.
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In UCs with many IDPs, officials had trouble finding local
workers, especially female IDPs, willing to take government
jobs. Therefore, LHWs had to be hired from other areas,
resulting in a lack of local connection and knowledge. One
official described an attempt to solve these problems in UC 9:
[A government official] set up more centers but could not hire
the staff to fill them. So they made a rotating system [bring-
ing staff from other areas]. . . .. But the staff hired were Urdu
speaking in this Pashto speaking area. And when we go back
and check on the centers, the people hired are not there [don’t
show up for work]. Implementation is a problem.
Thus, the areas that everyone agreed were most in need of
improved RI were also the areas where improvements were
most challenging to achieve.
Worker Motivation
Despite acknowledging the importance of their work, ground-
level workers in SITE said that low and unreliable wages and
a lack of accountability also made it difficult to stay moti-
vated at their jobs. LHWs were particularly adamant that their
pay (Rs. 9,000, about $100/month) was too low; this was the
sole source of income for many of their families.
One town-level official commented: “The problem is that
the government has hired a lot of workers for vaccines who
get a very low salary, and then they do not receive their salary
for 4 or 6 months. This is bad for motivation. They get
excited that they get a job and then they don’t get paid. It is
de-mobilizing and de-motivating.”
Workers also said that it was rare to be held accountable
for work performance: “Here no one will say anything to
the one who is doing a good job and working, or to the
one who is not working at all.” Thus, despite being con-
vinced of the importance of their work, many respondents
said their motivation flagged.
The Polio Eradication Initiative in SITE
The GPEI delivers OPV in resource-intensive door-to-door
campaigns. Areas with ongoing polio transmission have the
most campaigns delivering OPV; in SITE Town, there were
8–12 each year (Figure 3). During the 55 campaign days that
occurred the year we did our research, many workers in SITE
focused solely on polio (Figure 4).
Nearly all workers asserted that polio eradication was an
important and worthy goal. One explained when polio strikes
a child, “their whole life is ruined, and their family is also
affected.”
Overall, the polio program was the most robust health
intervention in SITE Town. Respondents appreciated the
relatively ample funding for polio, the functioning cold
chain, and the reliable vaccine supply, which contrasted
sharply with the resource shortages for routine work. One
official said, “PHC/RI and polio are two different tiers.
PHC/RI activities don’t get the money or staff salaries.”
The discrepancy between polio and other services was
particularly acute in UC 9. Because that area had recently
seen two polio cases, they had 12 door-to-door campaigns in
the year of our research. Thus, the area our respondents said
had the poorest routine immunization in SITE Town also had
the most intense campaign schedule.
Figure 3. Number of polio campaigns in a given year in Pakistan in
2010, reflecting the situation just before our field research. Some
subdistricts, including parts of SITE Town, had more campaigns
than the average districtwide number shown here. After 2010,
campaign intensity increased in many areas, with some commu-
nities visited up to 22 times in 2014. At present, the GPEI is
rethinking the strategy of high numbers of campaigns because, as
we argue here, this can contribute to worker and community dis-
satisfaction (Global Polio Eradication Initiative, 2015b). See
Figure 1 for the location of our study.
Figure 4. A child receives oral polio vaccine during a campaign.
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Worker Motivation for Polio
Despite their conviction that eradicating polio was a worthy
goal, many respondents said security issues, low and late pay,
relentless pressure, and dealing with refusals in repeated
campaigns left them fatigued.
“The biggest problem is of security,” a doctor said. “I
was at the dispensary preparing results and I was looted
of my wallet at gunpoint. The LHWs with us were rid of
their money and jewelry.” An LHW whose purse was
stolen in this incident commented ruefully, “They prob-
ably thought I make a lot of money by working in the
polio campaign.”
Polio-specific issues of pay were also de-motivating, espe-
cially coupled with workers’ existing dissatisfactions about
pay. Workers were given a stipend of Rs. 250 (about $3) per
day for work on polio campaigns—about half of the local
daily wage for unskilled labor and, commented one super-
visor, “neither enough for rent nor food.” Chronic delays in
payments, often disbursed as late as 6 months after a cam-
paign, exacerbated frustrations.
Especially given the low pay, relentless pressure to achieve
results in campaign after campaign wore on workers. One
supervisor said of his experience, “They [my workers] are
checked by the area in charge, the UC officer, WHO,
UNICEF. . . So they are checked a lot but paid very little.
They get 250 rupees and then 10 shoe hits.”
Yet, another supervisor added: “we have a group of very
loyal and dedicated workers who try their best to take care of
their work.” Most supervisors praised their staff for hard
work in challenging circumstances.
Polio Vaccine Refusals
One LHW said that “dealing with refusals—because it is
often very difficult to convince people to take the vac-
cine” was her most time consuming activity during cam-
paigns. Interacting with refusal parents could be
frightening, as in the case of a male health worker who
was hit in the face by an angry father. Understanding the
reasons for refusals is important not only because they
directly reduce vaccination coverage, but also because
refusals have a negative effect on polio workers’ motiva-
tion. While refusal families were overall a small minority,
they were clustered in specific areas (cf. UNICEF, 2013),
and most of our interviewees mentioned dealing with
refusals as a job frustration.
Refusals in SITE were frequently fueled by parental frus-
tration with the emphasis on polio in the absence of broader
government services. An LHW said, “They complain that the
government has other responsibilities towards them. . . and
they ask, why do you not give us that?” A town-level official
observed:
We get asked why do we repeatedly go for the polio cam-
paigns; why are we worried about polio. The people say: we
have so many other problems. The people have their own
priorities, first is water and living in difficult situations,
groceries and sanitation. They don’t have their basic needs.
And the polio campaign has gone on for more than 10 years.
Another added:
The households served by the polio program are upset
because they require other goods and services—wheat,
sugar, milk—but do not receive them. They do not want to
accept only polio drops. It doesn’t make sense to them. Polio
vaccine should be incentivized by providing other goods
along with it.
One LHW noted, “One complaint is that before a month
even ends, another polio campaign starts.” The attention and
emphasis given to polio campaigns led to credibility issues in
the context of generally poor government services.
IDPs and Vaccine Refusal
Distrust of polio vaccine was particularly marked in IDP
communities. These groups, who had heard loud and clear
from the provincial government that they were not wel-
come; who frequently lived in areas such as UC 9 with
poor government services; and who had fled their homes
because of government and international military actions,
had ample reason to distrust any program promoted heavily
by the national and provincial governments and interna-
tional actors.
Many workers we interviewed expressed distaste for work-
ing with IDPs. One said, “First of all, they are coming from
the outside, and they are spreading germs and diseases in this
area because they are the carriers of these germs. So they
create a problem for us. On top of that they do not listen to us
and are refusal cases.” Such attitudes likely exacerbated many
IDPs’ distrust.
In the context of IDPs’ understandable distrust of the
health system, rumors were common, particularly that the
vaccine caused infertility and was “American.” One LHW
said, “The mothers ask us whether the polio vaccine has
come from America and whether the Americans have added
family planning medicine to it.” Workers also noted that the
fake vaccination campaign involved in the search for Osama
bin Laden caused difficulties. One said, “We tell them that if
they will give polio vaccine to their children, they will be
saved from being disabled. Some people do not understand,
saying that it is the American police.”
Fears about police were especially acute in areas home to
what respondents described as “anti-government elements.”
One noted, “We have people here who have political affilia-
tions and they do not want their information to be leaked
out. . . There is a law and order problem and they think that
we are police informers.”
Thus frustrations about the focus on polio, coupled with
political anxieties, made polio vaccination in IDP commu-
nities particularly difficult. An LHW observed:
Vaccinations are happening. . . but many migrants from
Pashto speaking areas, no matter how much we motivate
them, do not take polio vaccines. And in some areas there
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is a lot of garbage, open sewers where children are bathing. . .
a child fell in an open sewer in UC 1 and got polio, even
though he had polio vaccination. I often wonder how polio
can be eradicated. I think apart from vaccination, we should
keep children away from dirty water.
Refusals were clustered in areas with poor RI and poor
sanitation.
Broader Health Services Are Important to Polio
Eradication
The discrepancy between polio and other health services existed
because the polio program was doing its utmost to vaccinate
every child in a challenging environment. Through tireless
commitment, the program repeatedly reached children who
received few or no other health services. Yet, unfortunately,
this discrepancy created problems for the polio program itself,
contributing to refusals and to worker demotivation.
In this context, the standard techniques of social mobiliza-
tion are unlikely to be completely effective. The reasons that
parents refused vaccine were not primarily cultural (although
refusals were concentrated in IDP populations), nor did they
reflect a lack of education (although parents did have mis-
conceptions). Rather, the root cause of refusals was a deep
distrust of government and international actors that provided
few if any desperately needed services, but administered
polio vaccine door-to-door every month (cf. Coutinho &
Banerjea, 2000; Renne, 2010; Taylor, 2015; Yahya, 2007).
Managers and workers alike said that making headway in
cases of entrenched refusal was extremely difficult. One
UNICEF employee described challenges in providing social
mobilization:
If someone comes for RI in a center and the door is closed, it
is bad. The management of basic services is a problem, and
this happens. Also, as outsiders, we come to UC 9 at break-
fast and have to leave before dinner as it is not a safe area for
us. Out before dark.
Another worker explained:
We have approached the maulvis [religious leaders] asking
them to make announcements regarding the campaign
through their loudspeaker system, and even cited the fatwas
[consensus statements of religious leaders] regarding polio
work. However they refuse, saying the fatwa is about allow-
ing the drops and not announcements during the campaign.
[Laughs]. It is a strange situation indeed.
Another said, “Sometimes I feel that maybe we do not
know the proper way to make people. . . agree with us that
polio needs to be eradicated from our country.”
Pushing harder to get parents to accept polio vaccine is
unlikely to change their minds; rather, increased pressure
focused on this one issue may well lead to increased resis-
tance (Factor, Williams, & Kawachi, 2013). An approach that
targets the root causes of refusals is more likely to be
successful.
Changes Since 2012: Promising Initiatives
In 2012, high-level staff said the polio program was increas-
ing attention to RI. In 2016, these plans are in motion.
Strengthening RI is now a core stated objective of the
GPEI. The GPEI’s recent midterm review explains, “polio
communications products are aiming to promote broader
health at a time when many communities may be tiring of
polio specific messages and multiple requests to vaccinate
their children” (Global Polio Eradication Initiative, 2015b).
Within Pakistan, many initiatives to address the problems
our interviewees identified are underway. A Pashtun-specific
communications strategy has been developed. Worker train-
ing has been enhanced. And while implementation is still
imperfect, a major effort aims to get polio workers paid on
time.
Along with these interventions, refusals appear to be
decreasing—a UNICEF study showed an 80% reduction in
refusals in endemic high-risk areas nationwide as of 2014.
Noting this, UNICEF pointed out that meeting community
demands and building trust in vaccinators would be critical
moving forward (UNICEF, 2014).
“Health camps” in Karachi’s highest risk areas now pro-
vide interventions including TT vaccine and delivery kits, as
well as injectable and OPV. Evidence from similar camps in
Nigeria suggests that they effectively deliver injectable polio
vaccine (IPV) and reduce numbers of missed children,
including refusals (Nigeria National Primary Health Care
Development Agency, 2015); research on the effects of
these camps in other contexts would be valuable. Health
camps had reached nearly half a million people in Pakistan
by mid-2015, and had delivered polio vaccine to nearly
10,000 completely unvaccinated children (Pakistan Ministry
of Health, 2015).
The polio campaign strategy in SITE’s high-risk UCs has
also changed. Now, in a program called the Continuous
Community Protected Vaccination, dedicated polio staff in
these areas spend a week visiting houses and then a week
finding missed children, in a continuous monthly cycle. They
distribute “polio plus” kits along with polio vaccine.
Pakistan’s National Emergency Action Plan calls this strategy
a “success” (Government of Pakistan, 2015, p. 11).
Other initiatives, too, aim to broaden the services provided
with polio vaccine. A grant from the Canadian government
includes support for RI, maternal health, water and sanitation,
and nutrition. Other water-supply initiatives are also being
discussed in Karachi (UNICEF, 2015).
New Challenges
At the same time as these new interventions are being rolled
out, the polio program in Karachi faces new challenges. Most
seriously, polio workers have been targeted with ongoing
lethal violence. In SITE, an educator providing polio vaccine
was murdered (McNeil, 2013).
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In 2015, SITE Town, and particularly UC 9, remained
underserved by the government health system. There was
still no government health facility in UC 9, and no gov-
ernment doctor in all of SITE Town that spoke Pashto.
In Pakistan as a whole, differing cultures and different
hierarchies have made the collaboration between GPEI and
RI staff challenging (Claycomb, 2015; Expanded Programme
on Immunization & Global Polio Eradication Initiative,
2015). The result has been “sub-optimal implementation of
RI strengthening activities” (GPEI, 2015b, p. 22).
Further complicating matters, some people we spoke to
recently in SITE felt that the Continuous Community
Protected Vaccination had, in contrast to its intention, func-
tioned to increase refusals. One town-level official said that in
a given house in a high-risk area in UC 9:
The team is going over there, the supervisor is going over
there, the UC MO [Union Council Medical Officer] is going
over there, the RSP [Religious Support Person] is going over
there, the WHO people are going over there, so the person
will hesitate. Why are you coming again and again and
knocking on my door?
As a result of nonstop campaign activity, this official said,
“In the high-risk UCs, they are hesitating, the public. They are
refusing. . . The number of refusals is increasing.” This state-
ment reflects the perceptions of just one individual and is not a
conclusive finding. Given that the Continuous Community
Protected Vaccination is currently being considered for use in
other contexts, additional research is warranted.
Why Should the GPEI Do More to Spearhead General
Health Efforts?
Many people in SITE Town want to provide better services in
high-risk areas, and there are real barriers to achieving this.
The issues involved are complex and political. The GPEI
cannot change these realities and cannot build comprehensive
health systems in a city such as Karachi.
Why, then, should the GPEI spend time and money on
general health efforts—work that many within the polio pro-
gram see as a distraction? One answer is in the GPEI’s 2013–18
Strategic Plan, which notes that high RI coverage is essential to
eradication. The Strategic Plan commits to “working with
immunization partners to strengthen immunization systems.”
In Pakistan, it commits to working with local governments “to
establish immunization services in the most vulnerable popula-
tions” (GPEI, 2013, pp. 51, 111).
In the longer term, the GPEI’s legacy process aims to
provide support to broader health services. “The infrastruc-
ture required to eradicate polio is concentrated in many of the
lowest performing low-income countries, which are the most
challenging places to achieve other health objectives,” note
polio eradication leadership in a recent article. They call for
ensuring this infrastructure is “sustained and repurposed” for
strengthening RI (Cochi, Hegg, Kaur, Pandak, & Jafari, 2016,
pp. 281–282).
Also, our analysis suggests that in the short term, higher
quality RI and health services may be critical for the narrow
and immediate goal of eradicating polio. Because refusals grow
out of a distrust of national and international institutions, exa-
cerbated by a discrepancy in attention and funding for polio as
compared with other health services, well-intentioned initia-
tives to “increase noise” around polio eradication may prove
counterproductive (UNICEF, 2015). Given that polio eradica-
tion is already heavily politicized, standard social mobilization
efforts such as media campaigns, and even door-to-door educa-
tion focused on polio, may not make substantial inroads.
Folding polio vaccination into broader health activities in
the highest risk areas could be a key strategy for eliminating
the disease. Support for RI and other health initiatives in the
short term could be enlightened self-interest on the part of
Pakistan’s polio program.
The introduction of IPV into Pakistan’s RI schedule means
that RI is now more important than ever for polio eradication.
A new communications strategy for polio centered on RI
makes sense. But of course such a strategy will only work
when coupled with the concurrent provision of RI services.
What More Can Be Done?
The strategies we propose here would supplement, not
replace, efforts to build broad-based health systems.
Sustainable RI provision and constructing water and sanita-
tion infrastructure are complex, long-term projects. Other
actors including Gavi, the World Health Organization, and
provincial leaders are working on those fronts. We encourage
GPEI’s increasing support of those programs.
Given the aforementioned political dynamics, progress in
providing improved health services to Karachi’s IDP popula-
tions through these channels is likely to be incremental. In the
short term, providing targeted services in polio-endemic areas
could benefit the GPEI. It is worth evaluating the effect of
such interventions on community acceptance of polio
vaccine.
Here, we suggest some short-timeline strategies. We focus
on three areas where targeted interventions could pay divi-
dends for polio eradication: water, sanitation, and hygiene
(WASH); LHW services; and routine immunization.
Targeted Improvements to Water and Sanitation
Improved WASH in endemic areas of Karachi could impact
polio transmission by reducing fecal-oral transmission of
poliovirus, and by preventing diarrhea that interferes with
OPV efficacy (Grassly et al., 2006). More important,
improved services would lessen the contrast between poor
water and sanitation infrastructure and door-to-door provision
of polio vaccine—a disparity that frustrated parents and con-
tributed to refusals. We suggest the following strategies:
● Water-supply improvements: Water shortages are a serious
problem in Karachi, and make maintaining good sanitation
practices difficult (Hunter, MacDonald, & Carter, 2010). In
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the highest transmission areas of Karachi, the GPEI should
make water availability a high priority, for example by
providing water tanker trucks.
● Sanitation improvements: Where possible, open sewers
should be covered. In slum areas, provision of sanitation
facilities should be a priority (Mara, Lane, Scott, & Trouba,
2010). The sanitation needs of Karachi outstrip the GPEI’s
resources, but targeted improvements in polio-endemic
areas are possible.
● Water treatment improvements: Point-of-use water systems
are effective in Karachi (Luby et al., 2001a). These systems
could be provided during an OPV campaign, with follow-
up provision of chlorine solution in subsequent campaigns.
Education about the use of these systems could be inte-
grated with polio messaging. Such integration of OPV and
water treatment provision could help to ease the path for
health workers who hear complaints about focusing only
on polio. This would likely work best alongside the WASH
improvements previously outlined.
● Soap distribution: Soap distribution and handwashing edu-
cation are effective in Karachi (Luby et al., 2001b, 2006).
Distributing soap during OPV campaigns would be rela-
tively simple. This small intervention would likely have a
significant impact on community engagement only if
implemented alongside other WASH improvements.
Targeted Improvements to LHW Services
The challenges facing the health system in SITE Town are
substantial, and the GPEI is not in a position to address most
of them. Given that LHWs are such an essential part of polio
eradication’s workforce, helping them build trust is very
important. We suggest support for LHW supplies, including
medicines, in polio-endemic areas. Polio campaign trainings
could be an opportunity to learn about area-specific shortages
and follow through with essential supplies.
Targeted Improvements to Routine Immunization
Sindh’s EPI Program is working with Gavi to improve RI.
There are points where these agencies might have common
interests with the GPEI:
● Increased support for RI in health camps: Currently, not all
health camps provide RI; one report states that out of more
than 14,000 people attending health camps in Karachi,
fewer than 400 children received routine immunizations
(Pakistan Ministry of Health, 2015). Legacy plans to tran-
sition these temporary camps into permanent facilities
could help improve RI coverage in some of Pakistan’s
most poorly served areas.
● Permanent routine immunization posts: High-risk areas
such as UC 9 should be provided with infrastructure and
staff for RI. International and national pressure and funding
for these improvements should be immediate.
Such steps could be pivotal in polio’s last strongholds.
India achieved an end to polio transmission while integrating
communications with provision of additional health services
in polio-endemic areas (Closser et al., 2014; Coates,
Waisbord, Awale, Solomon, & Dey, 2013). Water, sanitation,
and routine immunization improvements are not easy or
cheap. In targeted areas of Karachi, they are doable. And
they could play a critical role in eradicating polio.
Acknowledgments
The authors are grateful to the following people for their
support of the study: Molly Abbruzzese, Ni’ma Abid, Altaf
Bosan, Kelly Cox, Elias Durry, Yasmine Gilbert, John Grove,
Obaid ul Islam, Sarwat Jehan, Farhat Khan, Zubair Mufti,
Wadood Myireh, Noor Sabah Rakhshani, Anat Rosenthal,
Pauley Tedoff, and Linda Venczel. These individuals bear
no responsibility for the conclusions drawn in this article.
Figures 2 and 3 were prepared by Anna Clements, Isabel
Shaw, and Hannah Judge of Broad Street Maps.
Funding
This research was supported by the Bill and Melinda Gates
Foundation (contract 20333). The publication of this article
was made possible by the generous support of the
American people through USAID under the terms of the
Cooperative Agreement AID-OAA-A-14-00028. The con-
tents are the responsibility of the Maternal and Child
Survival Program and do not necessarily reflect the views
of USAID or the U.S. government.
References
Bernard, H. R. (2011). Research methods in anthropology (5th ed.).
Lanham, MD: AltaMira Press.
Claycomb, P. (2015). Pakistan: Communication strategy for routine immu-
nization, 2015-2018. Islamabad, Pakistan: Islamic Republic of
Pakistan and UNICEF.
Closser, S., Cox, K., Parris, T. M., Landis, R. M., Justice, J., Gopinath, R.,
& Nuttall, E. (2014). The impact of polio eradication on routine
immunization and primary health care: A mixed-methods study.
Journal of Infectious Diseases, 210(Suppl 1), S504–S513.
doi:10.1093/infdis/jit232
Closser, S., Rosenthal, A., Maes, K., Justice, J., Cox, K., Omidian, P. A., &
Nyirazinyoye, L. (2016). The global context of vaccine refusal:
Insights from a systematic comparative ethnography of the global
polio eradication initiative. Medical Anthropology Quarterly.
doi:10.1111/maq.12229
Closser, S., Rosenthal, A., Parris, T., Maes, K., Justice, J., Cox, K., &
Neergheen, V. (2012). Methods for evaluating the impact of vertical
programs on health systems: Protocol for a study on the impact of the
global polio eradication initiative on strengthening routine immuniza-
tion and primary health care. BMC Public Health, 12(1), 728.
doi:10.1186/1471-2458-12-728
Coates, E. A., Waisbord, S., Awale, J., Solomon, R., & Dey, R. (2013).
Successful polio eradication in Uttar Pradesh, India: The pivotal con-
tribution of the social mobilization network, an NGO/UNICEF colla-
boration. Global Health: Science and Practice, 1(1), 68–83.
doi:10.9745/GHSP-D-12-00018
Polio Eradication and Health Systems in Karachi 39
Cochi, S., Hegg, L., Kaur, A., Pandak, C., & Jafari, H. (2016). The global
polio eradication initiative: Progress, lessons learned, and polio legacy
transition planning. Health Affairs, 35(2), 277–283.
Coutinho, L., & Banerjea, N. (2000). Social production of blame: Case
study of OPV-related deaths in West Bengal. Economic and Political
Weekly, 35(8/9), 709–717. doi:10.2307/4408967
Expanded Programme on Immunization, & Global Polio Eradication
Initiative (GPEI). (2015). Fourth IMG-RI subgroup face-to-face meet-
ing. Amman, Jordan: Authors.
Factor, R., Williams, D. R., & Kawachi, I. (2013). Social resistance frame-
work for understanding high-risk behavior among nondominant mino-
rities: Preliminary evidence. American Journal of Public Health, 103
(12), 2245–2251. doi:10.2105/AJPH.2013.301212
Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI). (2013). Polio eradication &
endgame strategic plan 2013-2018. Geneva, Switzerland: World
Health Organization.
Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI). (2015a). Global polio eradica-
tion initiative (GPEI) status report. London, UK: Author. Retrieved
from http://www.polioeradication.org/Portals/0/Document/Aboutus/
Governance/IMB/13IMBMeeting/2.3_13IMB.pdf
Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI). (2015b). Polio eradication &
endgame midterm review 2015. Geneva, Switzerland: World Health
Organization.
Government of Pakistan. (2015). National emergency action plan for polio
eradication 2015-2016. Islamabad, Pakistan: Author.
Grassly, N., Fraser, C., Wenger, J., Deshpande, J., Sutter, R. W., Heymann,
D. L., & Aylward, R. B. (2006). New strategies for the elimination of
polio from India. Science, 314(5082), 1150–1153.
Habib, M., Soofi, S., Ali, N., Sutter, R. W., Palansch, M., Qureshi, H., & Bhutta,
Z. A. (2013). A study evaluating poliovirus antibodies and risk factors
associated with polio seropositivity in low socioeconomic areas of
Pakistan. Vaccine, 31(15), 1987–1993. doi:10.1016/j.vaccine.2013.02.003
Hunter, P. R., MacDonald, A. M., & Carter, R. C. (2010). Water supply and
health. Plos Medicine, 7(11), e1000361. doi:10.1371/journal.
pmed.1000361
IDPs under pressure in Pakistan’s Sindh Province. (2014, August 4).
IRINnews. Karachi. Retrieved from http://www.irinnews.org/report/
100443/idps-under-pressure-in-pakistan-s-sindh-province
IDPs won’t be allowed into Sindh. (2014, June 17). Dawn. Karachi.
Retrieved from http://www.dawn.com/news/1113182
Independent Monitoring Board of the Global Polio Eradication Initiative.
(2015). Twelfth report: Now is the time for peak performance.
London, UK: Author. Retrieved from http://www.polioeradication.
org/Portals/0/Document/Aboutus/Governance/IMB/13IMBMeeting/13
IMB_Report_EN.pdf
Kazi, A. M., Murtaza, A., Khoja, S., Zaidi, A. K., & Ali, S. A. (2014).
Monitoring polio supplementary immunization activities using an auto-
mated short text messaging system in Karachi, Pakistan. Bulletin of the
World Health Organization, 92(3), 220–225. doi:10.2471/BLT.13.122564
Khattak, S. (2013, June 26). Displaced: IDPs in Karachi reluctant to go back
home. The Express Tribune. Retrieved from http://tribune.com.pk/
story/568438/displaced-idps-in-karachi-reluctant-to-go-back-home/
Luby, S., Agboatwalla, M., Painter, J., Altaf, A., Billhimer, W., Keswick, B., &
Hoekstra, R. (2006). Combining drinking water treatment and hand
washing for diarrhoea prevention, a cluster randomised controlled trial.
Tropical Medicine and International Health, 11(4), 479–489.
Luby, S., Agboatwalla, M., Raza, A., Sobel, J., Mintz, E., Baier, K., . . .
Gangarosa, E. (2001a). A low-cost intervention for cleaner drinking
water in Karachi, Pakistan. International Journal of Infectious
Diseases, 5(3), 144–150.
Luby, S., Agboatwalla, M., Raza, A., Sobel, J., Mintz, E., Baier, K., . . .
Gangarosa, E. (2001b). Microbiologic effectiveness of hand washing
with soap in an urban squatter settlement, Karachi, Pakistan.
Epidemiology and Infection, 127, 237–244.
Mara, D., Lane, J., Scott, B., & Trouba, D. (2010). Sanitation and health.
PloS Medicine, 7(11), e1000363. doi:10.1371/journal.
pmed.1000363
McNeil, D. (2013, July 21). Pakistan battles polio, and its people’s
mistrust. The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.
com/2013/07/22/health/pakistan-fights-for-ground-in-war-on-polio.
html
Nigeria National Primary Health Care Development Agency. (2015). 2015
Nigeria polio eradication emergency plan. Abuja, Nigeria: Author.
Nishtar, S., Bhutta, Z. A., Jafar, T., Ghaffar, A., Akhtar, T., Bengali, K., &
Rahim, E. (2013). Health reform in Pakistan: A call to action. Lancet,
381, 2291–2297.
Pakistan Ministry of Health. (2015). Pakistan polio program update.
London, UK: Independent Monitoring Board Meetings. Retrieved
from http://www.polioeradication.org/Portals/0/Document/Aboutus/
Governance/IMB/13IMBMeeting/5.1_13IMB.pdf
Renne, E. P. (2010). The politics of polio in Northern Nigeria.
Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
SteelFisher, G. K., Blendon, R. J., Guirguis, S., Brulé, A., Lasala-
Blanco, N., Coleman, M., & Sahm, C. (2015). Threats to polio
eradication in high-conflict areas in Pakistan and Nigeria: A poll-
ing study of caregivers of children younger than 5 years. The
Lancet Infectious Diseases, 15(10), 1183–1192. doi:10.1016/
S1473-3099(15)00178-4
Taylor, S. A. J. (2015). Culture and behaviour in mass health interventions:
Lessons from the global polio eradication initiative. Critical Public
Health, 25(2), 192–204. doi:10.1080/09581596.2014.895799
Tight security on Sindh borders to stop terrorists disguised as IDPs. (2014,
July 23). Dunya News. Karachi. Retrieved from http://dunyanews.tv/
index.php/en/Pakistan/230017-Tight-security-on-Sindh-borders-to-
stop-terrorists
UNICEF. (2013). Engaging the last 1% in Pakistan. Islamabad, Pakistan:
Author.
UNICEF. (2014). New insights on the road to zero. New York, NY:
Author.
UNICEF. (2015). Focus on low transmission season: Communication.
Islamabad, Pakistan: Author.
Yahya, M. (2007). Polio vaccines—“No thank you!” barriers to polio
eradication in Northern Nigeria. African Affairs, 106(423), 185–204.
doi:10.1093/afraf/adm016
40 S. Closser et al.
